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Summary points
zz Change in Djibouti’s economic and strategic options has been driven by four 
factors: the Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the impact of Ethiopia’s 
economic transformation and growth upon trade; shifts in US strategy since 
9/11, and the upsurge in piracy along the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts. 
zz With the expansion of the US AFRICOM base, the reconfiguration of France’s 
military presence and the establishment of Japanese and other military facilities, 
Djibouti has become an international maritime and military laboratory where new 
forms of cooperation are being developed.
zz Djibouti has accelerated plans for regional economic integration. Building on 
close ties with Ethiopia, existing port upgrades and electricity grid integration will 
be enhanced by the development of the northern port of Tadjourah. 
zz These strategic and economic shifts have yet to be matched by internal political 
reforms, and growth needs to be linked to strategies for job creation and a 
renewal of domestic political legitimacy. 
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Introduction
Despite hosting the United States’ only permanent military 
facility in sub-Saharan Africa, the strategically located 
city-state of Djibouti is invariably neglected in English-
language analyses.1 As a small state surrounded by larger 
ones in a region marked by different international tensions, 
its margin of manoeuvre is tightly constrained by external 
economic factors and strategic pressures. Yet this is hardly 
new and Djiboutian elites have long thrived on their 
state of dependency. Djibouti’s profile is enhanced by the 
fact that it hosts the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the regional body linking all of the 
greater Horn of Africa states. However, if the government’s 
activist regional diplomacy is to pay dividends, current 
economic growth and windfall revenues need to be coupled 
with the reform of domestic political structures and a more 
ambitious programme of job creation. This paper maps 
the changes in Djibouti’s infrastructure owing to two 
interlinked developments – increased inward investment 
and the structural transformation and growth of Ethiopia’s 
economy – and notes their regional ramifications. It then 
outlines changes to Djibouti’s strategic role as host to US, 
French and other foreign military facilities. It concludes by 
examining how all these changes have altered the stakes in 
Djibouti’s economic and political development.
From French enclave to strategic 
crossroads 
Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977 but 
for the next two decades France remained the domi-
nant power in the country. The French army provided 
its government’s core finance, and guaranteed external 
defences in exchange for military bases and extensive 
training facilities. Regional volatility was constant, culmi-
nating in the overthrow of authoritarian governments in 
Ethiopia and Somalia in 1991. The creation of Eritrea to 
the north and Somaliland to the south was a watershed 
for Djibouti, whose population shares clan and linguistic 
affinities with the Afars in Eritrea and several Somali clans 
in Somaliland. Upheaval in Yemen, which lies barely 30 
kilometres from Djibouti’s northern coast and has exten-
sive historical ties with the country, has had less impact 
on it to date. 
An insurgency by Afar rebels marked the final years 
of the ailing President Hassan Gouled Aptidon’s rule.2 
Having governed for 22 years, he stepped down before the 
presidential elections in 1999 and was replaced by Ismail 
Omar Guelleh, widely believed to be his nephew, who then 
won a second term in 2005. A contentious constitutional 
change in 2010 allowed Guelleh to stand for a third term in 
2011. Although he won the election that year, campaigning 
was fractious. The opposition boycotted the polls following 
violence and arrests, while tensions reflected and accentu-
ated divisions within the president’s entourage. 
Change in Djibouti’s strategic options over the past 
15 years has been driven by four factors: the Ethiopian–
Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the rapid economic 
transformation in Ethiopia, shifts in US strategy in Africa 
and the Arabian peninsula since 9/11, and the upsurge in 
piracy along the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts. 
Historically, Djibouti owes its existence to its port 
and as a railhead for highland Ethiopia. In the first two 
decades of independence, port facilities were gradually 
expanded. Activities spread to include the handling of 
transshipments of containers, but Ethiopia remained 
the port’s principal customer. Eritrea’s independence 
from Ethiopia in 1991, and with it the latter’s loss 
of sovereignty over the ports of Massawa and Assab 
(which provide more direct access to highland Ethiopia) 
initially had a limited impact on trade flows via Djibouti. 
However, following the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea in 1998–2000, the former channelled almost all 
of its imports and exports via Djibouti and relocated its 
merchant fleet to the city’s port.
 1 This report draws on open-source materials. In addition to those articles cited below, of relevance are: Bezabeh, S.A., ‘Citizenship and the logic of sovereignty 
in Djibouti’, African Affairs, Vol. 110, No. 441, October 2011; Brass, J., ‘Djibouti’s Unusual Resource Curse’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 4, 
December 2008; Mesfin, B.P., Elections, Politics and External Involvement in Djibouti, ISS Situation Report, April 2011, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bits
tream/123456789/32288/1/15Apr11Djibouti.pdf?1; Amina Said Chiré (ed.), Djibouti contemporain (Paris: Karthala, 2012); Healy, S., Hostage to Conflict: 
Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011).
 2 Born in 1916, Aptidon first entered politics as a representative of the then territoire of the French Fourth Republic in 1946. He died in 2006. 
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The economic impact has been dramatic. Increased 
trade with Ethiopia has engendered new diplomatic 
and political linkages, reconfiguring a highly unequal 
mutual dependency (given Ethiopia’s vastly greater size 
and power) that is marked by frequent tensions and fric-
tion. Bilateral ties with Ethiopia were strengthened by 
the prickly diplomatic and military character of Eritrea’s 
regime. While still facing an unresolved military stalemate 
with Ethiopia, in 2008 Eritrea provoked a border skirmish 
with Djibouti over Ras Doumeira, a Djiboutian outpost 
overlooking the Bab al-Mandab straits, the southern 
approach to the Red Sea. Eritrea’s incursion prompted 
vigorous Djiboutian diplomatic efforts at the United 
Nations, the African Union and IGAD. Since negotia-
tions in Doha in 2010, Qatari troops have overseen a wary 
truce. A steady trickle of Eritrean defectors and migrants 
arriving in Djibouti is currently held in a camp at Nagad, 
close to the capital.
The second factor altering Djibouti’s strategic outlook 
has been the accelerated growth and structural trans-
formation of Ethiopia’s economy over the past decade. 
Urbanization, infrastructure development and both 
domestic and foreign direct investment have boosted 
trade flows. Djibouti has been careful to protect its 
sovereignty and economic margin of manoeuvre vis-
à-vis Ethiopia. It has been wary of direct Ethiopian 
investment, relying largely upon Gulf Arab capital and 
expertise for the expansion of its port facilities. Dubai 
was central to the funding and construction of the new 
container and oil terminals at Doraleh in 2009, 12 kilo-
metres to the west of the old port and Djibouti-ville’s 
congested town centre. Saudi Arabia is contributing to 
funds for the new Tadjourah port development in the 
north.
The third catalyst for change reflects the broader geo-
strategic upheaval in the region. A year after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the United States created a Combined 
Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). In 2008 
this was integrated into the newly created US Africa 
Command (AFRICOM). The United States’ facilities 
at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier became its sole perma-
nent base on the African continent. Djibouti now acts 
as the principal logistical hub for US and allied opera-
tions in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. It is also 
the launching-pad for drone surveillance and attacks, 
as well as the logistics hub for anti-piracy and other 
multilateral missions in the region. Meanwhile France 
retains almost 2,000 troops in Djibouti, their revised role 
reflecting further geo-strategic changes as US–French 
military cooperation is enhanced, both within and beyond 
the structures of NATO. 
The final factor of change is the complex linkages 
between multilateral military operations and anti-piracy 
measures in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. In a 
largely unplanned, incremental manner, Djibouti has 
become a laboratory for new forms of military and naval 
cooperation among and beyond NATO and EU forces. It 
is the logistics hub for the EU’s first joint naval mission, 
the anti-piracy operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Since 
2010 Djibouti has hosted the first Japanese overseas mili-
tary base to be established since 1945. It also frequently 
hosts vessels from other European and Asian navies, 
China, in particular, has developed extensive regional 
cooperation, including joint operations with US, EU and 
other fleets in the region.3 
 3 ‘U.S., Chinese navies in joint anti-piracy drills off Somalia’, Reuters, 18 September 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-china-usa-piracy-
idUSBRE88H0PY20120918; Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange (2012), ‘“Selfish Superpower” No Longer? China’s Anti-Piracy Activities and 21st-Century 
Global Maritime Governance’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1/2 (Spring/Summer), pp. 92–102, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/Erickson-Strange_Selfish-Superpower-No-Longer_PRC-Anti-Piracy_HAQ_2012-1-2.pdf.
‘ Djibouti now acts as the principal logistical hub for 
US and allied operations in 
East Africa and the Arabian 
peninsula ’
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 Whereas in the past ties with Paris were paramount, 
the multiplicity of new military and diplomatic partner-
ships poses new challenges for Djibouti’s foreign policy. 
Relations with France remain cordial, but Djibouti is in 
the process of expanding its already extensive diplomatic 
ties well beyond Francophone networks.4 
Political reform has not kept pace with these substan-
tive economic and strategic changes. President Guelleh 
has belatedly attempted to improve his domestic political 
legitimacy, via both electoral reform and the promotion 
of a younger generation of technocrats, diplomats and 
politicians. However, given the state’s political system 
rooted in patronage, without broader employment 
opportunities and wider income distribution, domestic 
discontent over both presidential and legislative elec-
tions will remain. 
Economic benefits of regional upheavals 
and infrastructure development 
Ethiopia’s trade boom, transshipments and port investment 
Djibouti’s ports are key to its geo-strategic importance 
in military and economic terms. They are a conduit for 
Ethiopian trade and a platform for the transshipment 
of goods. This involves the decanting of transoceanic 
container and bulk cargo from larger vessels to be redis-
tributed to East Africa and Arabian ports. The volume of 
trade has grown significantly as demand and port facili-
ties have expanded. In 2009 the ports handled 11 million 
tonnes of goods, double the volume of just five years 
earlier.5
The outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 
1998 triggered a considerable and ongoing economic 
windfall for Djibouti. In 1998 its handling of Ethiopian 
general cargo and petroleum products quadrupled as 
it became, almost overnight, the principal conduit for 
Ethiopia’s foreign trade. These developments immediately 
necessitated a major expansion and upgrade of port 
facilities and handling infrastructure, triggering plans 
for the expansion of conventional cargo and container 
capacity in Djibouti. 
Economic partnership with Dubai
In 2009 a $400 million container terminal was opened at 
Doraleh. The port expansion was overseen by Dubai Ports 
World (DPW), which signed a management agreement to 
run and upgrade Djibouti’s existing port facilities in 2000. 
Under the state-owned Port Autonome Indépendant de 
Djibouti, ageing infrastructure had been starved of invest-
ment while bulk-handling, livestock and the congested 
container quays close to the city were costly and inefficient 
by international standards.
DPW’s decision reflected two interlinked factors: 
Djibouti’s geographic and commercial advantages relative 
to its main regional competitors, and Dubai’s embryonic 
strategic partnership with a state viewed as relatively 
stable. By 2008 President Guelleh had formed a de facto 
strategic alliance with key business and political figures in 
Dubai, in part linked to an exceedingly ambitious plan for 
domestic economic transformation.6 The maritime costs 
of using Aden’s port and container facilities rose sharply 
following the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and 
 4 On the renewal of diplomacy, including the broadening of links beyond the Francophone sphere, see ‘Djibouti: opération séduction dans la diplomatie’, 
Jeune Afrique, 19 September 2011. President Guelleh’s own ties with Paris have on occasion been overshadowed by allegations of his involvement in the 
assassination of a French judge, Bernard Borrel, in Djibouti in 1995. 
 5 Economist Intelligence Unit, Djibouti, Country Profile, various issues. 
 6 Ethan Chorin (2010). Articulating a ‘Dubai Model’ of Development: The Case of Djibouti, Dubai School of Government, September. 
‘ The volume of trade has grown significantly as demand 
and port facilities have 
expanded. In 2009 Djibouti’s 
ports handled 11 million tonnes 
of goods, double the volume 
of just five years earlier ’
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a French tanker in 2002.7 DPW also wished to counter 
the competition to its flagship Jebel Ali Free Port facility 
posed by Oman’s development of the Salaleh container 
port in 1998. Viewed in retrospect, DPW’s Djibouti 
venture was a stepping-stone to its subsequent broader 
expansion in Africa.
These factors cemented an ambitious strategic partner-
ship between the Dubai ports conglomerate and Djibouti, 
and led to the construction of the Horizon Oil Terminal 
at Doraleh in 2004–05. Owned by Emirates National 
Oil Company, the terminal handles all fuel imports for 
Djibouti itself, as well as most of Ethiopia’s oil and gas 
imports. It also supplies all aviation and maritime fuels for 
the French, US and other military forces in the country. 
DPW’s strategic presence in Djibouti was underscored 
in 2002 when it agreed a 20-year concession to manage 
its international airport, adjacent to Camp Lemonnier 
at Ambouli. In 2010 a Dubai-based company also estab-
lished an airline within Djibouti, intending to replace 
the moribund national carrier and Daallo Airlines. The 
venture subsequently folded, notwithstanding the signifi-
cant demand for flights to Dubai and Europe from 
Somaliland transit passengers using Djibouti.8 The large 
and wealthy Somali diaspora in Dubai has played a 
guiding role in the partnership between Djibouti and the 
emirate. 
By 2006 DPW had overhauled the management of 
an expanded Djibouti Free Zones and Port Authority 
(DFZPA), modelled on and managed by Dubai’s Jebel Ali 
Free Zone. The company then announced a three-year, 
$400 million programme to build a container terminal 
with a capacity of 1.2 million TEU9 adjacent to the new oil 
terminal at Doraleh. This is run as a joint venture between 
DPW and the state-owned port authority, which retains a 
66 per cent stake.
Opened in 2009, Doraleh became the sole deep-
water port in the region able to handle contemporary 
15,000-tonne-plus container vessels. Doraleh’s overall 
potential capacity for handling containers far outstrips 
the current combined Ethiopian and Djiboutian 
domestic demand. From the outset the aim was to 
establish Djibouti as a nodal hub in DPW’s global 
network of container transshipment centres, offering 
customers from the Far East with vessels en route to 
European markets a way of avoiding a costly detour to 
Dubai’s Jebel Ali. In 2006, Dubai’s Nakheel corporation 
cemented the emirate’s economic and political ties with 
Djibouti by inaugurating the city’s first five-star hotel, 
the Kempinski Djibouti Palace Hotel. This provides the 
government with a sumptuous venue for regional confer-
ences as well as luxury accommodation for the growing 
number of military and trade delegations transiting 
through the city. 
While the oil and container ports at Doraleh have 
markedly improved Djibouti’s efficiency, dependence 
on one industry leaves the economy vulnerable to 
shocks. Notwithstanding ongoing problems in Aden, 
transshipment volumes have fluctuated significantly 
in recent years as container flows contracted owing 
to the global recession. This led to tension between 
the DFZPA and DPW in 2011, echoing earlier spats 
between the president and his principal business agent 
in the DPW venture.10 Simultaneously, there were disa-
greements over DPW’s contract to manage the Ambouli 
 7 The USS Cole attack of 2000 had two repercussions for Djibouti. Maritime insurance costs for Aden soared, rerouting container transshipments. It also 
prompted the US Navy to switch its bunkering facilities to Djibouti, the first stage in the development of what became the preferred location for the US 
military hub. 
   8 One often neglected dimension to Djibouti’s status as a regional hub is as the primary transit point to the outside world for the vast northern Somali/
Somaliland diaspora. Not only does this involve significant passenger flows, but Djibouti’s financial sector is now closely linked to both Gulf Arab and 
Somali financial capital. Djibouti’s port is also a key conduit for Somali livestock, competing with Berbera as a conduit to the vast markets for fresh meat in 
the Arabian peninsula. See Nisar Majid (2010), Livestock Trade in the Djibouti, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands, Chatham House, September,  
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109450.
 9  TEU: Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, the standard container metric.
 10 Businessman Abdourahman Boreh had been a confidant of President Guelleh and was instrumental in securing DPW investment for the Doraleh port 
expansion. Having reportedly opposed the constitutional changes in 2010, he was sentenced in absentia on corruption charges. In February 2013 the 
government opened a case against him in London courts, which sought to retrieve funds allegedly embezzled from the port authority. Though exceedingly rich, 
he has only limited domestic support and poses little threat to the president.
www.chathamhouse.org
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airport and the congestion of airspace. With the port of 
Aden continuing to suffer from Yemen’s acute political 
instability, however, transshipments picked up during 
2012. Tensions with DPW also appear to have abated 
following changes in management and the renewal of 
contracts. 
Interdependency with Ethiopia 
Ethiopia remains the leading client for all of Djibouti’s 
port facilities, and its dependency on Doraleh generates 
frequent tussles over costs and taxation. In mid-2012 
a serious crisis developed owing to administrative and 
regulatory changes in Ethiopia. This resulted in gridlock 
in the container terminal and considerable costs for 
Djibouti.11
Djibouti has resisted allowing Ethiopia to have equity 
stakes in port facilities. However, Ethiopia’s leading 
private-sector investor, Sheikh Alamoudi’s Midroc corpo-
ration, finances and operates bulk-handling facilities in 
the old port. Midroc’s installation resulted from Ethiopia’s 
need for rapid improvements in handling capacity in the 
wake of the 1998 Eritrean crisis. Midroc offloads, bags and 
despatches foodstuffs, fertilizers and other bulk cargos 
for Ethiopian traders and international clients such as 
the World Food Programme, which supplies much of 
northern Somalia and eastern Ethiopia’s food aid needs 
via Djibouti. 
Despite the lack of joint ventures between Ethiopia 
and Djibouti in private equity, their economic inter-
dependency changed gear when Ethiopia began to supply 
hydro-electric power to Djibouti. Electricity in Djibouti 
has hitherto been expensively produced by ageing and 
unreliable oil-fired generators. In a climate where air-
conditioning is crucial for offices, homes and industry, 
electricity costs have been a major barrier to growth. 
Following Djibouti’s connection to Ethiopia’s electricity 
grid in 2011, retail and industrial domestic tariffs were 
cut significantly, easing pressures on household and 
business budgets. 
While hydro-electric imports accentuate Djibouti’s 
economic and political dependency on its neighbour, it 
appears to consider it a price worth paying. For Ethiopia 
there are multiple benefits, including increased export 
revenues and significantly reduced energy costs at the 
port, and it is also the first stage in what is envisaged 
as a major regional export strategy of its abundant 
hydro-electric power.12 A further element of bilateral 
infrastructure integration was added in January 2013 
when ministers signed a contract to construct a pipeline 
to supply drinking water from a source 70 kilometres 
within Ethiopia to Djibouti-ville. This is scheduled to 
carry 100,000 cubic metres a day, with the project due for 
completion in 2014. 
Regional rail and port integration
Hydro-electric power is just one piece of a far larger 
Ethiopian infrastructure jigsaw that has long-term impli-
cations for Djibouti. In June 2012 Ethiopia announced 
a series of major contracts for a new 5,000-kilometre 
national rail network. Scheduled to be completed in 
eight phases, it is planned to eventually link the northern 
 11 The crisis was triggered by Ethiopia’s creation of Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise, a vast new parastatal body intended to combine the functions 
of three hitherto separate bodies: the shipping, maritime services and dry ports agencies. The simultaneous changes to import and trucking regulations 
culminated in a log-jam of 22,000 containers in Djibouti. 
 12 For one view on this, see Harry Verhoeven (2011), Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan’s Oil, Ethiopia’s Water and Regional Integration, Chatham House, June, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/175835.
‘ Following Djibouti’s connection to Ethiopia’s 
electricity grid in 2011,  
retail and industrial domestic 
tariffs were cut significantly, 
easing pressures on household 
and business budgets ’
www.chathamhouse.org
pa
ge
 8
Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub
Ethiopian highlands with Addis Ababa and the west. The 
plan is exceedingly ambitious in terms of engineering 
and finance. The value of the two contracts announced 
in June 2012 alone totalled $3.2 billion.13 While Chinese 
companies have dominated recent Ethiopian road and 
rail tenders, in June 2012 a Turkish consortium was 
awarded the contract to construct a rail branch east-
ward to the Djiboutian border.14 The network envisages 
connecting the northern highlands and Tigray to Djibouti 
via a branch-line to Elidar. This would then provide a 
rail link to Djibouti’s Tadjourah port via the Djiboutian 
border town of Balho. If completed, this would restore the 
cheaper and more direct link to the sea that Ethiopia lost 
with the severing of ties with Assab in 1998. It would also 
facilitate potash exports from the nearby Danakil depres-
sion, the subject of significant exploration and investment 
in recent years. 
In July 2012 the foreign ministers of Djibouti and 
Ethiopia also signed an agreement to renovate the 
countries’ rail link via Dire Dawa. In late 2011 Ethiopia 
awarded a $1.2 billion contract to the China Civil 
Engineering Construction Corporation to upgrade the 
Ethiopian track from Me’ese through Dire Dawa to the 
Djiboutian border crossing at Dewale, with 60 per cent 
of the cost reportedly to be covered by a Chinese soft 
loan.15
The proposed development of the port of Tadjourah 
illustrates a reconciliation of the tensions between 
Djibouti’s desire both to maintain economic sover-
eignty and to achieve closer economic integration with 
Ethiopia in order to boost growth. It has long harboured 
plans to develop its neglected northern settlements of 
Obock and Tadjourah. Marginalized politically and 
economically, the region is close to the Arabian penin-
sula and – given adequate infrastructural investment 
– a far more accessible outlet to the sea for highland 
Ethiopian markets. 
With Eritrea locked in economic and political 
paralysis for the past decade, the development of 
the port of Tadjourah is the logical extension of an 
expanded northern Ethiopian rail network. Early in 
2012 a call for tenders to construct a deep-water 
port was issued. On 14 December 2012 the construc-
tion of the port was formally launched by President 
Guelleh and Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of 
Ethiopia. Significantly, this was Hailemariam’s first visit 
to Djibouti since succeeding Meles Zenawi in August 
2012. During the inauguration ceremony he stressed 
the importance of integrating infrastructure to ties with 
Djibouti. Funding for the port is from the Arab League’s 
Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development and the Saudi Fund for Development. The 
port’s three new quays are scheduled for completion in 
2015. A complementary project is under way to upgrade 
the road from Tadjourah to Djibouti’s northern border 
post via Balho. 
 13 Details of the overall 5,000 kilometres network plan were announced in September 2011. See Ethiopian Railways Corporation, http://www.erc.gov.et/index.
php/projects/national-railway-network-of-ethiopianrne.html. 
 14 Initial contracts were awarded to Chinese and Turkish companies in June 2012. However, plans and tenders for the 734km line via Weldia, terminating at 
Elidar adjacent to Bahlo on Djibouti’s northern frontier, had not been announced by late 2012. See Daniel Berhane, ‘Turkish, Chinese sign up for Mekele–
Awash new rail route’, 29 June 2012, http://danielberhane.com/2012/06/29/turkish-chinese-sign-up-for-mekele-awash-new-rail-route-ethiopia/. In the 
event of a settlement with Eritrea, this Elidar branch-line could easily be extended to the port of Assab. 
 15 See ERTA, ‘Ethiopia, China sign agreement for construction of 1st phase of Ethiopia-Djibouti railway’, 25 October 2011, http://www.ertagov.com/en/component/
content/article/34-top1-news/691-ethiopia-china-sign-agreement-for-construction-of-1st-phase-of-ethiopia-djibouti-railway.html.
‘ The proposed development of the port of Tadjourah 
illustrates a reconciliation of 
the tensions between Djibouti’s 
desire both to maintain 
economic sovereignty and 
to achieve closer economic 
integration with Ethiopia’
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The Djibouti–Ethiopia–South Sudan axis 
South Sudan’s independence in 2011 and its reliance 
on exporting oil underlie a new regional vision among 
Djiboutian and regional elites. In February 2012 a tripartite 
memorandum of understanding was signed in Addis Ababa 
by the finance ministers of Ethiopia and Djibouti and South 
Sudan’s minister of petroleum and mines. It outlines plans 
to create a logistical corridor between the three countries 
comprising oil pipelines and parallel optic-fibre cables 
alongside Ethiopia’s ambitious new rail network. Further 
meetings were held in Djibouti in July and Addis Ababa 
in September, leading to the announcement of a $3 billion 
pipeline project.16 Details remain sketchy and, aside from 
the confident announcement of preparatory works, there 
remain significant political, financial and logistical barriers 
to such a venture. The desire to sign contracts in part reflects 
concern about competition from a rival route to South 
Sudan’s oilfields in the shape of the proposed Juba–Kenya 
corridor, with its terminal a new deep-water port at Lamu on 
the Kenyan coast.17 Officially, ministers have stated there is 
no direct competition between what are nevertheless clearly 
rival infrastructure projects. Given the immense financing 
requirements, it is unlikely that both projects could simulta-
neously be feasible or profitable in the short run. 
If consolidated, via construction and operating contracts, 
this tripartite axis would enhance the nature of Djibouti’s 
ties with Ethiopia and be a tangible stepping-stone to 
broader regional integration. It would also boost the prof-
itability of recent investment in bilateral oil supply (the 
Horizon terminal), hydro-electricity infrastructure, and 
the proposed northern Ethiopian–Djiboutian rail and road 
infrastructure. The outcome of the competition between the 
Juba–Lamu and Juba–Djibouti routes is thus a key element 
in the evolving debate over regional integration. 
Enhancing the strategic military hub 
The US presence: AFRICOM and drones
The United States’ CJTF-HOA has been based in Djibouti 
since 2002. Originally conceived as part of the response to 
the 9/11 attacks, it became the US military’s only permanent 
military facility on the African continent with the creation of 
AFRICOM in 2008. It is based at a former French military 
facility, Camp Lemonnier, where it shares runways with 
French forces and Djibouti’s international airport, Ambouli. 
The United States pays a reported $38 million annual rent 
to Djibouti for the facility. Over the last decade the US 
presence in Djibouti has progressively taken on a more 
complex and permanent character. In December 2011 the 
United States inaugurated a large new embassy complex to 
the south of Camp Lemonnier. It has now announced plans 
and contracts to significantly expand airstrips and facilities. 
There are distinct yet interlocking dimensions to US 
military policy in the Horn. CJTF-HOA’s mission is billed 
as primarily providing military cooperation and training to 
allied African states. In practice these currently comprise 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as the 
Indian Ocean states of Mauritius, the Comoros and the 
Seychelles. The US base provides selective support for 
the African Union force in Somalia, AMISOM, as well as 
complementing French training of Djibouti’s small armed 
forces. In 2012 a first contingent of 850 Djiboutian troops 
joined those of Uganda and Burundi in AMISOM. US 
military ties with Ethiopia have also steadily increased, and 
the Americans have established small outposts in southwest 
Ethiopia and northern Uganda as well.18 CJTF-HOA mili-
tary missions and training with all of the ‘partner’ African 
states are linked to ad hoc development assistance delivered 
by US military personnel, notably in health and education.19
 16 ‘Oily Alliance’, Capital, 8 October 2012, http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1763:oily-alliance-
&catid=35:capital&Itemid=27. In September 2012 Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s finance ministers reconfirmed their commitment to the pipeline corridor when they 
met with South Sudan’s petroleum and mines minister in Addis Ababa.
 17 The Lamu–Southern Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor was inaugurated in March 2012. In May of that year the African Development Bank announced a 
$12 million loan for road construction from Lamu. ‘African Development Bank finances Lamu road corridor project’, Sudan Tribune, 8 May 2012,  
http://www.sudantribune.com/African-Development-Bank-finances,42520. 
 18 Craig Murphy, ‘U.S. expands secret intelligence operations in Africa’, Washington Post, 13 June 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-secu-
rity/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_story.html.
 19 CJTF-HOA has a significant outreach and public relations component. See http://www.hoa.africom.mil/index.asp, and the regular ‘Duty in Djibouti’ videos 
posted to YouTube. 
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Wedged between Yemen and Somalia, and astride one 
of the world’s key shipping lanes, Djibouti provides the 
United States with proximity to Al-Qaeda affiliates in 
Yemen, Somalia and East Africa. It allows monitoring of 
and direct attacks against individuals and groups hostile 
to the United States. The Greater Horn of Africa has long 
been a theatre for what subsequently became known as the 
‘War on Terror’. The failed 1995 assassination attempt on 
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia, the 1998 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam US embassy bombings and the 
2000 attack on the USS Cole are a reminder that US mili-
tary strategy in the Horn needs to be seen from a broader 
chronological and strategic perspective, rather than purely 
a post-9/11 one. CJTF-HOA comprises a wide range of 
military units, with US authorities citing 23 tenants at 
Camp Lemonnier, including elements of the Joint Special 
Operation Command charged with counter-terrorism. 
The base currently covers 500 acres and houses around 
3,200 personnel, including military, civilian support and 
contractor staff. In 2012 contracts were issued to further 
expand the facility. Yet while its operations are large in 
relation to Djibouti itself and comparable foreign bases else-
where on African soil, it is best understood as one element 
in a wider network of American facilities in the Indian 
Ocean, Middle East and Asia. Thus CJTF-HOA is a staging 
post for US deployment elsewhere via a network encom-
passing Bahrain and the Indian Ocean (including facilities 
in Diego Garcia and the Seychelles), as well as a staging post 
for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Here again, plans to expand the US presence in Djibouti 
need to viewed in this broader geo-strategic context, rather 
than simply in terms of policy towards the Horn. 
Djibouti has also become a hub for US drone attacks 
since 2010. Before 2012, the presence of drones was an 
open secret. As well as operating from the airstrip shared 
with the international airport, several drones had crashed, 
including one on the outskirts of the city. In October 2012 
the Washington Post published details of the escalation 
of US drone and other covert anti-terror operations from 
Camp Lemonnier, claiming that ‘Over the past two years, 
the U.S. military has clandestinely transformed it into the 
busiest Predator drone base outside the Afghan war zone.’20 
The newspaper revealed plans for a further $1.4 billion 
expansion of US military facilities. It chronicled a steady 
intensification of drone activities since 2010, when eight 
Predator drones joined those already deployed to Djibouti.21 
Conventional and surveillance forces were further strength-
ened in October 2011 with the deployment of a squadron of 
F-15E Strike Eagles, operating alongside the French Mirage 
and Transalls.22 The Washington Post also detailed activities 
by up to 300 Special Operations personnel in Djibouti and 
estimated that 50 US military flights a day were using the 
Camp Lemonnier-Ambouli airstrip in July 2012. 
The growing volume of personnel and military hard-
ware has prompted plans to enlarge Camp Lemonnier’s 
facilities, including new taxiways, storage facilities and 
accommodation blocks. This reflects US strategic priorities 
in the region and a variety of tactical ad hoc cooperation 
agreements with regional forces and the growing number 
of other military forces in Djibouti and the Horn. Media 
reports have fuelled US debates over drone use, triggering 
publicity over US and French military activities in the 
Horn and Djibouti. 
For Djibouti’s rulers, the increased scale and nature of 
US military operations bring significant revenues as well 
as risks. To date any resentment at the foreign presence 
has been muted, and overt public criticism appears non-
existent.23 In July, Finance Minister Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh 
 20 Craig Murphy, ‘Remote US base at core of secret operations’, Washington Post, 26 October 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
 21 Ibid. The Washington Post reports collated unclassified sources, official information requests and interviews in Washington and Djibouti, including with CJTF-
HOA’s commander.
 22 Both US and French militaries regularly report on joint missions. See ‘Coalition refueling training enhances interoperability, partnerships, mission capabilities’, 
CJTF-HOA public affairs office, 28 November 2012, http://www.hoa.africom.mil/getArticleFresh.asp?art=8470&lang=0. See also French Ministry of Defence, 
‘Djibouti: exercice interarmées et interalliées CASEX 2012’, 7 December 2012, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/djibouti/actualites/
djibouti-exercice-interarmees-et-interalliees-casex-2012.
 23 ‘L’administration Obama justifie l’élimination d’Américains, La Nation, 7 March 2012. The story carried details of US debates on the legality of drone attacks. Currently the 
principal domestic comments concern the relative lack of employment generated by the self-contained US base, which imports almost everything from US sub-contractors. 
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said: ‘Of course, we worry about the risks that could be 
represented by the international military and security 
presence […] We accept that it represents a threat to us 
in terms of security’.24 While he was referring to Djibouti’s 
vulnerability to domestic or foreign terrorist attacks, there 
is also the potential for public backlash were there to be 
a major aviation accident in Djibouti-ville or its densely 
populated suburbs.
France’s reconfigured presence 
Despite its growing military presence, it is facile to view 
the United States as simply displacing French power in 
Djibouti. Even with the further reduction in its military 
presence in 2011, France still has more frontline troops, 
aircraft and firepower permanently based there than the 
United States does. France is still legally the external guar-
antor of Djibouti’s security, including its air and maritime 
space.25 As such, it is involved in extensive intelligence 
and logistical cooperation with the United States, as well 
as with the growing array of multilateral forces operating 
in the country. Its role is enhanced by its de facto status 
as the logistical anchor for EUNAVFOR’s vessels and 
personnel. 
France has a closer historical relationship than the 
United States with Djibouti’s ruling elite and paramilitary 
forces. Although relations have changed, France’s military 
engagement remains extremely significant. In the 1980s its 
military direct and indirect expenditure, as well as private 
capital and services, accounted for the lion’s share of the 
formal sector of Djibouti’s economy. This is no longer the 
case, although France continues to invest in the education 
sector, notably secondary education via its lycées. It signif-
icantly cut the number and changed the composition of its 
troops in Djibouti at the end of the 1990s, down to 2,600. 
More significantly for Djibouti’s economy, family postings 
were slashed and troops rotated far more frequently, and 
local spending fell considerably. 
Djibouti remains host to France’s largest military base 
in Africa. Nevertheless, changes in the French military 
presence are largely the consequence of changing priori-
ties in Paris. The 2008 Defence White Paper prompted a 
series of strategic and cost-cutting measures, including 
a significant reconfiguration of forces in Africa and the 
closure of bases in West Africa. Defence agreements with 
all former French colonies in Africa were renegotiated and 
Djibouti’s role in the global projection of French power 
was reconfigured.
The 1977 military agreement under which French 
forces guaranteed Djibouti’s territorial integrity and 
external defence was updated most recently in 2011. 
Under the terms of the new agreement, France pays €30 
million a year for its installations and training facilities. 
It has around 1,900 military personnel in Djibouti: 1,400 
permanently at Camp Monclar, situated between the city 
centre, the airport and the US facility at Camp Lemonnier, 
and around 500 on rotation between France and other 
regional bases.26 
The composition of French forces also altered signif-
icantly in 2011.27 The 13th demi-brigade of Foreign 
Legionnaires, based in Djibouti since the 1960s, transferred 
to Abu Dhabi. A reconfigured regular Army regiment 
 24 ‘Djibouti: Western bases pose a manageable risk’, Djibouti Today, 16 July 2012, http://www.djiboutitoday.com/m_news.php?ID=186. 
 25 The classified terms of the original defence accord were amended in 1991 and 2003.
 26 Notably garrisons in Abu Dhabi, Chad and Libreville (Gabon), plus the French territories of Mayotte and La Réunion.
 27 See French Ministry of Defence, ‘Les forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti’, 23 August 2012, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/
djibouti/dossier/les-forces-francaises-stationnees-a-djibouti. 
‘ Even with the further reduction in its military presence 
in 2011, France still has 
more frontline troops, aircraft 
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based in Djibouti than the 
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remains based at Camp Monclar and is complemented by 
separate Air Force and Navy contingents, also stationed 
permanently in Djibouti.28 France also maintains small 
military outposts and landing strips elsewhere in the 
country,29 and runs reconnaissance posts at maritime 
frontiers, including Ras Doumeira and Ras Bir at Obock. 
France is also now engaged in greater cooperation 
with US and other forces, partly reflecting its full rein-
tegration into NATO’s command structure since 2009 
and its participation in multilateral forces, including in 
Afghanistan. In July 2012 a five-year agreement was signed 
between France and the United States to enhance aerial 
logistical cooperation between their forces in Djibouti. 
Both forces regularly report publicly on joint missions in 
and beyond the country.30 
France has also played a lead role in training Djibouti’s 
small armed forces. Since 2006 its Djibouti-based 
forces have provided training and logistical support to 
Burundian and Ugandan AMISOM contingents, and from 
2011 to 2012 it was instrumental in preparing Djibouti’s 
AMISOM contingent, the first ever such overseas deploy-
ment for the country’s troops. 
Multilateral anti-piracy missions and EU engagement 
Changes in France’s military presence are due in part to its 
central role in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 
and Indian Ocean since 2008. In 2009 Djibouti became 
the operational base for EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the first 
ever joint EU naval operation and as such a key opera-
tional element of the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy. It is scheduled to run until December 2014. EU 
naval forces make use of both French and US facilities 
in Djibouti, adding an additional layer of military and 
maritime intelligence-sharing. French facilities host the 
Spanish and German contingents, as well as the force HQ 
support area for Operation Atalanta, whose command is 
based in the United Kingdom. 
In July 2012 the EU launched a new naval mission, 
EUCAP Nestor. This €23 million operation, agreed initially 
for two years, is designed to complement Operation 
Atalanta by strengthening local maritime capacities. 
Djibouti’s costal defences and maritime surveillance, 
overseen by French forces, have been reinforced by 
recent technical cooperation. This includes the provi-
sion of fast coastal patrol boats by the United States and 
France. Announcing the new programme, the EU’s high 
representative for foreign affairs and security policy, 
Catherine Ashton, stressed the desire to see local powers 
increase their capacity to combat piracy.31 Djibouti is 
already home to the Djibouti Regional Training Centre 
for Maritime Affairs, a facility providing training for law-
enforcement officers and coastguards. The Atalanta and 
Nestor missions, coupled with the EU’s commitment to 
strengthening IGAD (whose secretariat is in the country) 
as a regional body, highlight the importance of Djibouti to 
Europe’s policy towards the Horn of Africa.32
A multinational maritime laboratory? 
The scale of maritime operations out of Djibouti, within 
formal and ad hoc missions, has expanded over the past 
five years. Anti-piracy missions have acted as a catalyst 
for a deepening array of cooperation initiatives, in turn 
enhancing the strategic importance of Djibouti at the 
intersection of the Bab al-Mandab, Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean routes.
Djibouti is home to a growing Japanese and Chinese 
military presence. Having temporarily used US facili-
ties, a Japanese base, situated close to Camp Lemonnier, 
 28 The 5e régiment interarmes outre-mer is supported by its own aircraft: 4 Puma, 2 Gazelle helicopters. The air force (Base aérienne 188) has 7 Mirage 2000, 
one C160 reconnaissance plane and 2 Puma helicopters. 
 29 In March 2012 a 900-metre airstrip was inaugurated in the extreme north of the country. This consolidates radio-telecommunications, air and maritime 
surveillance of Djibouti’s northern borders with Eritrea, Ethiopia and the coastal station of Ras Doumeira.
 30 See French Ministry of Defence, ‘Djibouti: exercice interarmées et interalliées CASEX 2012’. 7 December 2012.
 31 Consilium/EU External Action, press release on launch of Eucap-Nestor, 16 July 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/131746.pdf.
 32 See European Parliament, The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impacts and Opportunities, October 2012,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN.
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opened in July 2011. Around 600 members of its Maritime 
Self-Defence Forces rotate between Japan’s naval vessels 
operating from the port of Djibouti and the camp. Naval 
units protecting Japanese shipping in the region had oper-
ated out of the US base prior to 2011. Japan is reported to 
pay an annual rent of $30 million for the facilities, similar 
to the sums paid for either of the far larger US and French 
bases. This has led to an expansion of Japan’s civilian aid 
programme to Djibouti, which has also become a hub for 
wider development activities in the Horn by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency. 
China too has expanded military and economic ties. Its 
vessels have made extensive use of Djibouti’s port while 
protecting Chinese-flagged shipping transiting through 
the Gulf of Aden and it has become increasingly involved 
with multilateral anti-piracy operations since 2008. These 
activities have significance beyond the regional and mari-
time realms. They have been described as ‘the first major 
instance in which China has dispatched security forces 
independently in areas outside its sovereign territory 
to protect Chinese citizens and national interests’, and 
as such ‘China’s only sustained direct military presence 
in the global commons’.33 Between December 2008 and 
July 2012 its Navy conducted 12 separate anti-piracy 
escort missions, providing protection to vessels from over 
50 countries. These missions have facilitated extensive 
Chinese interaction with US, NATO (Ocean Shield and 
Allied Protector missions) and EUNAVFOR multilateral 
operations. In 2012 China took a leadership role in the 
Bahrain-based ‘Shared Awareness and De-confliction’ 
quarterly process to facilitate the coordination of anti-
piracy escort schedules. 
President Guelleh attended the Fifth Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing in July 2012, and 
ministers, including Finance Minister Dawaleh, also made 
high-profile official visits to China in 2012. Its growing 
military assistance includes training and the construc-
tion of a hospital in Arta. Economic ties were further 
bolstered in 2012 by the announcement that the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) will construct a 
300 MW geo-thermal plant on Lake Assal. Earlier in the 
year the China–Africa Development Fund announced 
a $6.4 million soft loan to Djibouti. In April 2013 it was 
announced that China Import-Export Bank will fund 
development of a salt handling port terminal at Ghoubet. 
Chinese funding for the Tadjourah–Ethiopia rail and port 
link has also been mentioned as a possibility. 
China is far from being the only significant non-
OECD country to deploy naval forces to the region. In 
October 2012 Russia requested permission to station two 
Il-38 reconnaissance planes at the French military base 
in Djibouti, citing its need to contribute to anti-piracy 
activities. The navies of Iran, Malaysia and India have all 
also been active in unilateral and multilateral operations, 
using Djibouti’s ports. However, while Iran has provided 
some aid to Djibouti, in recent years it has been primarily 
India – which has a growing commercial and diplomatic 
presence there – and China that have expanded bilateral 
programmes with the government.
The domestic challenge 
Internal politics: stagnation and renewal
The important strategic and economic changes outlined 
above have yet to be matched by comparable political 
reforms in Djibouti. The heavily personalized, patronage-
based polity is a mirror of the country’s social and 
 33 See Erickson and Strange, ‘“Selfish Superpower” No Longer?’, p. 92. 
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economic realities. The formal sector is that of a classic 
rentier economy. A small elite comprises a relatively 
well-educated and well-paid cadre of civil servants, plus 
a small business class that subsists largely from foreign 
trade. Formal-sector salaries sustain a narrow, largely 
urban electorate, which coexists with the extremely poor 
remainder of the population. Most of the latter live on 
the outskirts of Djibouti-ville. At an average of $2,350 per 
capita, gross national income is far higher than in neigh-
bouring states,34 yet this figure masks extreme inequalities. 
With unemployment estimated at 60 per cent, indices 
of absolute and relative poverty are among the worst in 
Africa. The livelihoods of the majority of Djiboutians 
are largely indistinguishable from those of the country’s 
transient population of migrants and refugees from neigh-
bouring states. 
This economic dualism is reflected in political life. 
The official claim of a population of 818,000 in 2009 
is widely believed to be a considerable over-estimate. 
Although 200,000 voters were registered to vote in 2008, 
only 112,000 participated in the 2011 presidential poll. In 
the most recent, February 2013 legislative elections, just 
176,000 people registered to vote. 
Perceptions and aspirations among the elite and the 
disenfranchised majority are shifting, partly in keeping 
with the declining influence of the Francophone world 
and improved communications.35 Windfall incomes from 
the port, foreign military bases and investments from Gulf 
Arab states (primarily from Dubai, and Saudi Arabia on a 
smaller scale), as well as Iran to an extent, have enabled the 
president’s office to sustain patronage networks among 
the country’s narrow elite. More recently there have been 
limited efforts to prompt formal income redistribution, 
notably via social housing and infrastructure (implicitly 
linked to the 2011 election campaigns). However, the state 
maintains tight controls on the media and freedom of 
expression, and there has been a steady expansion in the 
size and capacity of the gendarmerie and other paramili-
tary forces. 
For much of the 1990s the authorities and their French 
protectors were preoccupied with a long-running, low-
intensity Afar insurgency, primarily in the north of the 
country. In 2001 some elements of the rebel Front pour la 
restoration de l’unité et de la démocratie, including veteran 
Afar dissidents, were co-opted into an alliance with the 
ruling party, the Rassemblement populaire pour le progrès 
(RPP). This ‘alliance’ became the leading component in 
what was rebranded as the Union pour la majorité prési-
dentielle (UMP). This loose political body continues to 
be the main formal channel for patronage. It comprises 
a mosaic of small, largely personalized factions that 
dominate the National Assembly, in what is formally 
a semi-presidential republican government. Afar–Issa 
tensions are a constant refrain of domestic political life. 
Paradoxically, if investment is now channelled into the 
impoverished north, Afar resentment may become more 
public. Plans to develop Tadjourah port have already trig-
gered both expectations and inter-communal tensions 
over employment opportunities. 
Political continuity has masked underlying tensions. 
In April 2010 President Guelleh triggered resentment by 
getting the UMP, which held all 65 of the seats in the legis-
lature, to annul the constitutional clause that prevented 
him from seeking a third presidential term, which he duly 
won in April 2011. 
 34 UNDP, Human Development Report, GNI per capita in PPP, constant 2005 terms of $2,350, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/DJI.html.
 35 These changes are reflected in the pattern of Djiboutians living abroad. No longer restricted primarily to France, there are diaspora communities in  
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Gulf states. Migration and settlement patterns often follow those of fellow Somali and Afar migrants from  
the Horn. Given the lack of de jure international recognition of neighbouring Somaliland, Djibouti has been the consular conduit for large numbers  
of Somalis. 
‘With unemployment estimated at 60 per cent, 
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This controversy aggravated underlying economic 
resentment. It coincided with the uprisings in the Arab 
world and triggered demonstrations in the months prior 
to the election. Disaffected youths and a unified opposition 
mobilized thousands of people in protests on 18 February 
2011, during which anti-government slogans echoed those 
of the Arab Spring.36 These demonstrations were force-
fully repressed, and opposition leaders and human rights 
activists were arrested. Rioting prompted a further clamp-
down on civil liberties and freedom of expression. Voting 
in the election, which opposition parties boycotted, was 
calm but the government still found it prudent to expel US 
observers. Political tensions also reflected divisions in the 
presidential entourage, in turn underscoring the role of 
Gulf Arab funding, personal patronage and Djiboutians’ 
dependency on complex regional economic ties.37 
Tensions around the presidential election altered the 
regime’s attitude and strategies toward political legitimacy. 
By 2011 there was a clear need to reform the sclerotic 
ruling party and effect a generational change. This agenda 
was advanced in February 2012 when UMP candidates 
were defeated in municipal and regional elections by a 
nebulous youth-based ‘independent’ group, led by activ-
ists drawn from civil society. The UMP’s defeat was widely 
believed to have been engineered by the president’s office 
as part of a strategy to marginalize party elders. 
In September 2012 Finance Minister Dawaleh was 
appointed as the head of the UMP. Before becoming 
minister in 2011, he had been President Guelleh’s 
campaign manager in that year’s election. A technocrat 
with a background in business and port administration, 
he has an increasingly prominent international profile, 
attending both China-Africa and regional IMF gatherings 
in 2012.38 He is widely viewed as a potential successor to 
Guelleh in the next presidential polls, scheduled for 2016. 
Following electoral reforms in October 2012 the 
February 2013 legislative elections were the first to be 
run under a limited form of proportional representation. 
Up to 20 per cent of seats were allocated in proportion 
to votes cast.39 The opposition had boycotted previous 
polls, but critics, including some from the diaspora, now 
coalesced into the Union pour le Salut National (USN) and 
contested the polls. Campaigning was noisy but mostly 
good-natured, with both the USN and a smaller opposi-
tion faction having access to state media and making 
extensive use of public rallies and social media. Polling 
itself was reported calm, with numerous foreign delega-
tions observing it. With only 120,000 people voting (a 
turnout of 68 per cent of the 176,000 registered voters) 
preliminary results were available the following day. 
Under the new 80:20 per cent proportional represen-
tation system, in Djibouti-ville, a narrow majority of 
49.4 per cent for the ruling UMP gave it 28 of the 35 seats 
allocated to the capital. 
Amid considerable confusion, these results were vehe-
mently contested by the opposition, with contradictory, 
unconfirmed sets of results in circulation. Street protests, 
arrests and sentencing of opposition activists followed.40 
The Constitutional Council published definitive results 
on 13 March. While controversy, recriminations and 
sporadic street protests continued, particularly in the 
sprawling suburb of Balbala, USN representatives declined 
to take the 20 per cent of National Assembly seats awarded 
to them when the new legislature convened on 18 March. 
By convention Djibouti’s the premiership is held by an 
Afar, and Abdoulkader Mohamed Kamil, a veteran Afar 
loyalist from Obock, was duly appointed prime minister 
in a new cabinet announced on 31 March. 
The controversy and friction surrounding the results 
and aftermath of the elections have for the present derailed 
 36 Mesfin (2011), Elections, Politics and External Involvement in Djibouti.
 37 See footnote 10 above on Abdourahman Boreh.
 38 See also Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh (2012), ‘Djibouti’s Strategic Position in the Horn of Africa’, Chatham House meeting summary, http://www.chathamhouse.org/
publications/papers/view/185237. 
 39 ‘La réforme électorale émane de la volonté politique du Président’, interview with Minister of Interior Hassan Darar Houffaneh, Agence Djiboutienne 
d’Information, 6 December 2012.
 40 Daher Ahmed Farah, spokesman for the USN and a prominent activist who had returned from exile in Belgium to contest the elections, was sentenced to two 
months’ imprisonment on 22 March on charges of ‘incitement of insurrection’. Three religious leaders were jailed on identical charges. 
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the president’s hopes of boosting his government’s legiti-
macy via the creation of a parliamentary opposition and 
bolstering support from a younger political elite. It is 
therefore likely that the distribution of real power and 
resources will continue to reflect patronage politics along 
long-standing Somali–Afar and individual Somali-clan 
affiliations.
Economic dualism? Unemployment and poverty 
The need to broaden the economic foundations of the 
state’s political legitimacy is inextricably linked to attempts 
to address acute social and economic divisions. While 
civil servants and the business elite enjoy high incomes, 
recent economic growth has been achieved with minimal 
economic diversification. Heightened dependence on the 
port and soaring rents from foreign military bases have 
failed to generate many new jobs. Educational standards 
remain low and opportunities are few. The latest IMF 
Country Report for Djibouti notes that, despite growth 
and significant change, ‘It continues to bear the hallmarks 
of a dualistic economy in which a modern economic 
rent-generating [sector] co-exists alongside an informal 
economy.’41
The vast majority of Djiboutians eke out a precar-
ious, marginal livelihood. The country is afflicted by 
pervasive poverty and extensive food insecurity, and 
abysmal living standards exist in many of Djibouti-ville’s 
suburbs. Steady GDP growth, estimated annually at 
four to five per cent for the past three years, and fiscal 
reforms have received conditional backing from the 
IMF.42 However, the data are unreliable; the majority 
of Djiboutians depend upon informal-sector activities, 
while formal-sector growth is closely linked to port 
activities that are in large part dependent on economic 
trends and policies in Ethiopia. 
The government’s own (far from reliable) data and the 
copious, regular reports from Djibouti’s donors high-
light that, despite some improvement in the past decade 
(notably in educational enrolment and maternal health), 
the country continues to score poorly on almost all human 
development indicators. Two-thirds of the population still 
live in relative poverty, and around 25 per cent experi-
ence extreme monetary poverty.43 This reflects high costs 
of living, notably for electricity, imported food and other 
goods. The latter includes the mild stimulant qat, which is 
imported daily from Ethiopia and is a key component of 
consumer spending. 
After the 2011 presidential poll, the government 
revised plans for growth and employment, establishing 
a clearer focus on new infrastructure, the energy sector 
and broader job creation. This trend will be reinforced 
by the new government and ministers appointed in 
April 2013, with the aim of enhancing regional integra-
tion and improving domestic educational opportunities. 
While such policies are designed to address youth aspi-
rations, in practice there are few signs of a radical 
change vis-à-vis entrepreneurship and job creation. 
Previous programmes delivered few jobs, with enterprise 
stymied by high costs and low levels of education and 
labour productivity. With several thousand young people 
joining the job market annually, outward migration will 
accelerate, but domestic growth will also continue to 
attract Somali and Ethiopian migrants, increasing pres-
sure on the social infrastructure.
Djibouti maintains a relatively open economy and 
security risks are rarely far from ministers’ minds. This 
reflects not only fresh memories of the urban unrest that 
preceded the 2011 elections and has again punctuated 
the aftermath of the 2013 polls, but also concern over 
deeper communal disaffection. Much of this revolves 
around patronage among Afar and Somali sub-clans, 
with communal grievances refracted through the presi-
dent’s entourage. There is also growing awareness that 
Djibouti’s domestic weaknesses increase its potential 
vulnerability to terrorist threats. This point was explicitly 
acknowledged by Finance Minister Dawaleh in 2012, 
 41 IMF (2012), Djibouti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Annual Progress Report. IMF Country Report No.12/131, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2012/cr12131.pdf. Under its Extended Credit Facility, the IMF has provided Djibouti with $25 million in budgetary support since 2008. 
 42 Economist Intelligence Unit, Djibouti Country Report, various issues. 
 43 IMF, Djibouti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Annual Progress Report. IMF Country Report No.12/131, 2012.
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when he said: ‘The area [that] maybe we have to take care 
of is properly fighting poverty and unemployment of our 
youth. Terrorists will be using that to manipulate those 
in need.’44 
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted key shifts in the strategic 
context in which Djibouti’s leaders have operated over 
the past 15 years. Regionally, closer economic and infra-
structural integration with Ethiopia appears to offer a 
relatively secure foundation for economic growth. With 
Eritrea still isolated, the upgrade of the existing rail link 
via Dire Dawa, coupled with the proposed development 
of Djibouti’s northern port of Tadjourah, will lessen 
pressure on the congested road corridor from Doraleh’s 
container and oil terminals over the coming five years. 
Tadjourah’s development should also generate employ-
ment and income in the extremely marginalized north. 
Diplomatic talk of a more extensive ‘regional corridor’, 
with Djibouti connected by pipelines to South Sudan via 
Ethiopia, appears extremely embryonic. Yet the debates 
serve to underscore the centrality of Djibouti and its 
leadership to plans for regional integration, which go 
well beyond the state’s current role in Somalia and the 
tangible and symbolic aspects of hosting IGAD’s head-
quarters. 
Over the coming decades, Djibouti is likely to face 
increased competition from both rehabilitated Eritrean 
ports and Somaliland’s Berbera. However, given recent 
investment in port facilities and associated infrastructure 
links to Ethiopia, Djibouti has established significant 
cost and capacity advantages over these regional rivals. 
Assuming both that economic growth in northern 
Ethiopia intensifies and policies in Eritrea eventually 
shift in order to allow its gradual reintegration into the 
regional economy, Djibouti will remain the primary 
conduit for Ethiopian trade in the next ten years or so. 
Even if Djibouti’s integrationist policies were to falter, for 
example through lack of finance, such competitive advan-
tages will remain. In practice, however, future leaders are 
likely to vigorously promote integration agendas, bilater-
ally and via IGAD, in order to consolidate Djiboutian 
competitiveness. Projects signed in 2012–13 also suggest 
that Chinese and Arab finance is keen to back Djibouti’s 
economic vision as a strategic hub. 
The expansion of Djibouti as a regional logistics hub 
has brought with it significant inward investment from 
Gulf Arab states. This in turn has strengthened its role as 
a conduit for African–Arab trade links, most notably for 
Dubai-based and Somali entrepreneurs, including those 
of southeast Ethiopia. Further financial-sector reforms 
could enhance its role as a trading hub within IGAD and 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, as 
well as that of conduit to the Arabian peninsula, counter-
balancing what is a de facto service-sector dependence on 
Ethiopian trade flows. 
Djibouti’s strategic role as host to US, French and 
other foreign military facilities is unlikely to change in 
the medium term. Even if anti-piracy operations decline 
in the coming decade, its status as a relatively secure and 
discreet strategic logistical hub will remain. Anti-piracy 
missions have been the catalyst for an array of new forms 
of multilateral diplomacy and extensive naval and mili-
tary cooperation. Aspects of what this paper has termed 
an ‘international maritime and military laboratory’ – 
involving vessels not only from NATO and EU forces but 
from a wide array of Asian states, and including extensive 
 44 ‘Djibouti: Western bases pose a manageable risk’ (see note 24 above). 
‘ Despite the doubts over political pluralism, corruption and 
fragile development capacity 
highlighted here, Djibouti’s 
small size and strategic value 
mean that financial support will 
continue to be forthcoming’
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US–Chinese naval interaction – are likely to persist as 
multilateral military naval and intelligence cooperation 
intensifies in and around the Gulf of Aden. 
A domestic backlash against the growing US presence 
seems unlikely. However, given its small, relatively open 
economy and its heterogeneous population’s extensive 
links to neighbouring states, Djibouti remains vulnerable 
to external destabilization; attacks on city-centre cafés two 
decades ago were never adequately explained, and a repeat 
of such violence cannot be ruled out. While the govern-
ment’s role in Somalia, coupled with its dynamic regional 
and international presence, generates considerable diplo-
matic and political capital, it also brings attendant security 
risks. Such issues are enhanced by ruling elites’ linkages to 
the complex intra-Somali politics of both Somaliland and 
southeastern Ethiopia. The complexity of such ties will 
be heightened by the fact that these neighbouring regions 
will be the site of extensive oil and gas exploration and 
production in the coming decades, for which Djibouti will 
mostly likely be the logistical hub. 
For all its domestic economic contradictions, Djibouti 
enjoys considerable support from its different allies and 
donors. Despite the doubts over political pluralism, 
corruption and fragile development capacity highlighted 
here, its small size and strategic value mean that financial 
support will continue to be forthcoming. With President 
Guelleh scheduled to step down in 2016, what is less sure 
is whether a younger generation of politicians will have 
the political will to attempt to overcome the country’s 
structural barriers to growth. New and more radical poli-
cies will be required to ensure the wider distribution of 
windfall gains from a growing economy that rests on 
accelerated regional integration and rising rental incomes 
from foreign military bases. Domestically, economic 
growth needs to be linked to strategies for job creation 
and a renewal of domestic political legitimacy. 
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